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AN
ESSAY
TOWARDS A
DEMONSTRATION
OF THE
Soul's Immateriality.

By HENRY GROVE.

Ἐστὶ μέλλει ἀνιδνεύσαι τὴν

Ἐν αὐτῷ δεῖ εἶναι.

PLOTINUS.



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THE
P R E F A C E.



THE Arguments produc'd in the following Essay, in behalf of the Soul's Immateriality, have all of them their Foundation in its Faculty of Thinking. This Faculty is universally acknowledg'd not to be essential to Matter, and I have attempted to prove that it cannot, by any way possible, be afterwards superinduc'd. But however not knowing the Success of these Arguments, I would here mention one of another kind, which begins where the others conclude. And, whereas the usual Method hath been from the Immateriality of

the Soul to argue its Immortality, I shall at present serve my self of its Immortality to shew that it is immaterial: for, granting the Nature of the Substance was not to be known by its Operations, and that the thinking Principle within us might be divisible, for any Inconsistency that can be demonstrated between the Properties of Divisibility and Cogitation, yet from hence we ought not, as the Scepticks do, to infer that the Soul is mortal, ev'n abstracting from Revelation. No! but, on the contrary, we should first of all impartially examine the several Proofs of the Immortality of the Soul, drawn from the Perfections of God, as a Being infinitely wise, and just, and good; and from the Nature of Man as a reasonable Agent; And if these appear convincing, as I am perswaded they must do to an unprejudic'd Mind. From the Immortality of the Soul thus establish'd, we should advance to the Belief of its Immateriality: it not being likely that what is naturally Mortal should be immortaliz'd by the mere Pleasure of God. The Natures of things seem to be good Indications of the Existence God design'd them for; if mortal, that He design'd them for a mortal Duration; and consequently, from the Duration of Things

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we may determine their Natures, and because of the Immortality of the Soul's Duration, be confident that it is naturally immortal, and, because naturally immortal, that it cannot be a System of Matter. The Immortality of the Body after the Resurrection, which we Christians believe on the Testimony of the Gospel, is no Prejudice to this Reasoning, in regard the Body is not the whole Being, nor immortaliz'd for its own Sake, but as belonging to a Composition, one Part of which is immortal by the Priviledge of its Nature.

*The Argument from the Divisibility of Matter, which I have chiefly insisted on, tho' an old one, as may appear from the Motto on the Title Page, hath yet of late Years been manag'd to greater Advantage than ever; particularly by the learned Dr. Clarke in his admirable Letters, which for strength of Reasoning, and fair Controversy, have not been often equal'd. And what shall they do that come after such a Writer? But either thankfully make use of his Assistance, as I have done, or, neglecting the Lights which he would furnish them with, run the Hazard of committing Mistakes, which they would not otherwise have been guilty of? From that Author, 'tis
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most probable, I took the Form of the Argument, which I have cast into several Propositions; tho' I do not remember that I was aware of it at the time of drawing it up. If I have plac'd the Argument in a more advantageous Attitude for some Understandings; if, by contracting it into a narrower Compass, I have added to the Strength of it, without rendering it obscure; if I have supplied any seeming Defect, or made any other Improvement in it, I shall not think my self to need an Excuse.

As to the rest of the Essay, let but the Reader allow what is here advanc'd, a fair and attentive Consideration, and I shall have nothing to complain of, even tho' the Issue should be, that he thinks it to carry much less Evidence and Weight with it, than it does in the Opinion of the Writer.

And here I should have troubled my Reader with no farther Preface, had not a Book, with this formidable Title, Clavis Universalis, or a Demonstration of the Non-existence and Impossibility of an External World, given me occasion to state the Evidence we have for the Existence of Bodies, against this and other such metaphysical Refiners, as in
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the following Essay, I have aim'd to prove the Existence of spiritual Substances against the Materialists. The first Reflection I made on reading this facetious Author, was concerning the Extravagance of the human Intellect, which, like a fiery unbroken Horse, will not be confin'd within the Paths prescrib'd it, but starts out into unaccountable Absurdities.

Truth, as well as Virtue, hath its Extremes, and it is not more natural for the Will to run into Excesses in Action, than for the Understanding to commit the same Error in Thinking. Some have taught, there is nothing but Matter in the Universe; Others, that there is nothing but Mind or Spirit; Will not a third Sort rise up, and assert that neither one nor the other, i. e. that nothing at all exists?

Tea, I my self will undertake to prove this by the same way of Reasoning which this Author makes use of to demonstrate the Impossibility of an External World. From the Difficulties that press each Side of the Question, concerning the Divisibility of Matter in Infinitum, He draws this Inference, that there can be no such thing as Matter; the Subject of the Question, which, if it existed, must

must either be divisible or not divisible, in infinitum. In like manner say I, 'Tis to our Conceptions impossible that any thing should have existed from Eternity, all Duration being successive, and made up of Moments, every one of which was once present, and therefore had a Beginning ; and if every Moment, then the whole Duration must have had the same : and yet, on the other Hand, 'tis manifestly impossible that any thing should arise out of nothing, without some pre-existent Cause to produce it. Now these Premises being admitted, can there be a more unavoidable Conclusion than that Nothing does, ever did, or can exist ?

What I have to say to this Author shall be comprized in a few Pages ; for I reckon that it would be as needless to return a particular Answer to every Paragraph of his Book, as to give one's self the trouble of cutting off every Toe or Finger from a Monster, whom we could dispatch with one solid Knock on the Head.

*If it will oblige the Author, I yield him what he contends for in the first Part, that the World, which is the immediate Object of Perception, is not external. I have pleaded for the same Thing in a Discourse which only waits till the favourable Reception of this
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shall encourage it to appear abroad. Where I endeavour to shew, that our Knowledge of the World, which we call visible, is by Idea, not by Intuition. And that I should make choice of the same Argument to prove this which Mr. Collier hath done, disposes me the rather to believe that we are both in the right; and were led to this Thought, not by Chance, but by the clear Evidence that accompanies it.

But what great Advantage Mr. Collier can have from this Concession to demonstrate the Impossibility or Non-existence of an external World, I do not see.

Against his Attempt to demonstrate that such a World is an utter Impossibility, I offer this one Argument, which I am contented to have ventured in the List against his Nine, That our having an Idea of Matter (which is what the Author means by an external World) proves Matter to be possible; forasmuch as an absolute Impossibility can never become the Object of Conception. Every Possibility hath some kind of Existence in the Power that is able to produce it into Being; and, for that Reason, may have an Ideal Existence, when it doth not exist really. But

an absolute Impossibility being a mere Nothing, it is every whit as impossible to frame an Idea of any such Impossibility, as it is to conceive of a Square Circle, or of the Number Three made up of twice two. Of Things equally impossible, it is equally repugnant to form any Idea; and therefore if Matter were an utter Impossibility, or a pure Nothing, the Impossibility of having an Idea of it must be the same, as in the Case of a Square Circle, &c. Every Idea is something, but something can never be fit to represent mere Nothing. How then come we to have an Idea of Matter, or an external World? The least we can infer from this Idea is, that Matter is not impossible.

And if Matter be possible, what should make us doubt of its actual Existence? It may be said, Because no such Thing is visible; for we see nothing but our own Ideas; and to what Purpose should we go about to suppose an external World that is invisible?

My Answer is, That if the World serves all the same Ends both of Contemplation and Action, tho' knowable only by Idea, as it would if it were visible, or the immediate Object of Perception, then its Invisibility can be no Reason

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Reason against its Existence. Now that it doth answer all the same Ends, I thus prove; and, First, as to Contemplation. That which would exercise our Contemplation in the Frame of a World that was visible, must be the vast Extent of the Whole; and the beautiful Order, great Variety, and wise Subserviency of the Parts: From all which we should be led to admire the infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness of the supreme Cause. And are not these Perfections equally display'd? And is there not the same Reason to adore them, in the Formation of this World, if in the main Correspondent to our Idea of it, as if it were immediately seen? I can discern no difference. I will try if this may not be illustrated. A Piece of Sculpture admirably wrought is put out to View; but, to preserve it against the Injuries of the Weather, or for some other Reason, is varnish'd over. Every Body extols the Artist, and is pleas'd with his Work; and yet no one sees that which was the immediate Subject of his Art, being hid under the Varnish. Our Ideas are this thin Varnish spread over the Face of Nature, which do not hinder us from passing a Judgment of it; because they express outward Objects, much as the Var-

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nish takes the Form of the Work upon which it is laid. And then, Secondly, As for Action: If my Idea of an Object, which I would approach or avoid, represent it in the Place where it is, why is not this every jot as well as if I had Notice of it by immediate Perception? So far then we have clear'd our Way, that an eternal World may possibly exist; and that no good Reason can be drawn from its Invisibilty, that it doth not actually exist.

I now proceed to demonstrate its Existence after this manner: I have certain Ideas which I call Simple; such are the Ideas of Solidity, Extension, &c. I find it impossible to get rid of these Ideas, or to add to their Number. I find likewise a Variety of complex'd Ideas that were introduced into my Mind without my willing it, tho' at the Time many of these did first appear there, I had the free and entire Exercise of that Faculty; such are the Ideas of a Dog, a Horse, &c. which Ideas I cannot forbear having actually present to my View at certain Times, (I mean, when I see, or fancy that I see such and such Objects before me.) My Sensations too are independant of my Will; I cannot encrease their Number, or repeat those I have experienc'd when I please. All which
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forces me upon this Conclusion, That the Cause of these Ideas and Sensations is external. But that there is a World of Beings without me agreeing to my Ideas, and which have Powers that are at least the occasional Causes of my Sensations, doth not from hence immediately appear; for why may not God, (whose Existence I learn from that of my own Soul) by his Almighty Power raise these Ideas and Sensations in me, no Objects existing that are the exemplary Causes of my Ideas, or the occasional Causes of my Sensations? The Thing is not absolutely impossible. But that it is in Fact impossible, because not reconcilable with undoubted Principles of Truth, I think may be easily prov'd.

The Representativeness of Ideas, which unavoidably leads Men to conceive of Things as existing without them; the Liveliness, the Order, the Constancy, and the Uniformity which plainly distinguish their waking Ideas from those they have in sleep; the concurrent Testimony of the other Senses with that of Sight, which is such, that when the Sight gives a Person Intelligence of an Object, either his Feeling, or Smelling, or Tasting, or Hearing, one, or more, of all these do many times bear
witness

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witness to the same Thing. All these, with Observations of a like Nature, have wrought in all Mankind a fix'd Perswasion of an external World; which hath always past for very reasonable, and will still do so, after all the Endeavours of one or two merry Gentlemen with their Fellow-Creatures to make them renounce their Senses. So that he who asserts the Non-existence of an external World, that is to say, that God hath furnish'd Men with as good Evidence for the Existence of Things that are not in Nature as they could derive from Objects really existing, doth not consider as he ought the Greatness, Veracity and Wisdom of the Supreme Being. It is infinitely beneath His Divine Majesty, and the Gravity of His Providence, to amuse and delude poor Mortals with mock Shews, and empty idle Visions; and to annex real Pleasures and Pains to merely fanciful Impressions. Neither is it more reconcileable with the divine Sincerity for God to assure me by several conspiring Proofs that there are outward Objects, that my Senses are exercis'd about them, and the Reports they give of them are to be credited; and all this with Intent to make me believe it, when the whole is no better than Trick and Delusion:
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And I fear it would be found as inconsistent with the Wisdom of God to make it a natural Duty to adore that and other Attributes in the Structure of a World that was never created. He would not surely be beholden to a Deception for the Glory of his Wisdom, Power and Goodness, and refer us for a Proof of these Perfections to Creatures that are only Imaginary.

And that which strengthens this Reasoning, is, that God hath not left us any Way, obvious to Mankind, of knowing the Non-existence of an external World, which He might and therefore would have done, if such a World did not exist: For notwithstanding Mr. Collier is pleased to say, That whatever is Visible must as such appear External, and that therefore there is a Necessity that our Ideas should seem to be without us; I must desire some other Proof besides his bare Affirmation. What will he say of the mundane Idea in the divine Mind? That it appears external? It would appear then to be otherwise than it is; which nothing can be supposed to do with regard to an understanding

derstanding every Way perfect. It is therefore no Contradiction for a Thing to be visible that doth not appear distant: And if so, would not the wise Author of our Nature, in Case there were no external World answering to our Idea of it, have so contrived our Ideas, that they should appear to be at home in the Mind, thereby to prevent the Mistake we otherwise run into of Things existing without us? Nay to me this seems the most natural State of our Ideas. I will endeavour to explain myself. Suppose then a hollow Globe endued with Perception, and painted on the Inside with Birds, Beasts and Fishes, and to have the Knowledge of all that is delineated within it; the whole Delineation being within the Globe, and the Perception the Globe hath of it but one Act, is it not certain that the Appearance which this Representation would most naturally make to the Globe must be of something comprehended within it self? And the same it would probably be with the Mind, if there were not some external World, to signify and represent which our Ideas, by the Rules of divine Perspective,
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appear External. But granting it to be an inseparable Property of every Thing that is Visible to appear External, yet, on Supposition there were no external World, who can doubt but that by some easy and standing Law of our Nature God could, and therefore would, have signified to us, that our Ideas, notwithstanding the Show they make of being External, were not so, nor intended to denote Things External, by bearing their Resemblance ?

Against all that hath been said, I know but of one Objection that deserves an Answer, and that is this : The Supposition of the Non-existence of an external World doth not at all derogate from the Sincerity, or any other Attribute, of God, because even upon this Supposition nothing appears to exist that doth not exist ; for all that appears to exist is only what we see, but we see nothing but our Ideas : So that if there be any Thing in this Case repugnant to any Perfection of God, it is that Ideas should have the Appearance of External, which are not ; which Mr. Collier will be ready to

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think bears as hard upon me as upon him.
I answer,

First, By denying that nothing appears to us to exist besides our Ideas, or the Images of Things transmitted by the Sight. He that affirms this (as the Author doth in effect) is either out of his Senses, or forgets that he hath more Senses than one; for do not Solidity, Extention and Figure, appear to the Touch to exist?

Secondly, An External World appears even from our Sight to exist. I do not say that it appears thus to our Sight. Tho' the External World be not Visible, yet the Argument from our Sight for the Being of such a World is so manifest, that if there be no such World, we are deceiv'd and impos'd upon. I beg this Gentleman for once to suppose with me, that there are solid extended Substances; and to suppose farther, that a Spirit assuming a Vehicle of Air, appears in the Form of a human Body, would not the Author think Mankind to be in the right who consent to call such an Apparition a Desceptio Visus? Tho' in this Case there is nothing appears to the Sight to exist that
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doth not exist; for we see the outward Shape and Superficies of a Man, and that is all we can see in Bodies the most close and compact. The Flesh, and Blood, and Bones are never visible, being conceal'd under the outward Surface: But because the outward Appearance of a Man uses to be accompanied with these, when it is not, we say, properly enough, that our Sight hath deceiv'd us. In like manner, tho' the External World be never seen by us, yet our Ideas having the Appearance of something External, signify the Existence of such a World, especially concurring so exactly with our Sensations.

Thirdly, Upon the receiv'd Belief of an External World, there is not the least Difficulty to reconcile the seeming Externeity of our Ideas with Truth. For the Design of our Ideas being to represent not only the Existence of Things, but the Manner of their Existence, it is absolutely necessary that to represent Things external and distant, our Ideas should seem to be external and distant. A World there is really existing, with all that wonderful Beauty which we suppose to be in it, altho' what is generally believ'd to

be that World is not so, but a mere Representation in our own Minds. Which only demonstrates the Perfection of the divine Skill in Painting so much to the Life, that we mistake a Picture for the original Substance. But if there be no External World, the seeming Externeity of our Ideas will be altogether unaccountable.





AN
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OF THE
Soul's Immateriality.

SECT. I.



THE Soul is That in every Man which reasons, deliberates, resolves, feels Pleasure, or Pain, &c. All which when we would express by a single Term, we make Use of the Word *Thought.*

Thought is an Operation that involves in it a Consciousness of it self. So that when a Person is said to think, the Meaning is, he perceives, or is conscious of something that passes within him.

This perceptive conscious Principle, I affirm, and shall endeavour to prove, is Immaterial; by Immaterial intending neither more nor less than that it is not a divisible, and solid Substance, which is our Notion of Matter.

The Medium by which I shall attempt the Proof of this, is, in general Consciousness or Thought; proceeding by this plain Method.

First, I shall remove the chief Prejudices which lie against the Belief of the Soul's Immateriality.

Secondly, Produce the Argument from which I think I have a Right to conclude, the Soul is Immaterial.

First. The chief Prejudices against the Belief of the Soul's Immateriality, are these, A pretended Contradiction in the

the Idea of an Immaterial Substance; the Unconceivableness of an Union between Soul and Body, on Supposition of the Soul's being Immaterial; the mutual Dependence of Soul and Body in their Operations; and lastly, the Appearances of Sense and Reason in Brutes. Now if concerning each of these I plainly shew, that it is a Prejudice, and no more, I shall have the Advantage to obtain a fairer and more impartial Examination of the Proofs which follow.

I. To begin with the pretended Contradiction that is found in the Idea of an Immaterial Substance: How doth that appear? Why, in affirming of the same Thing, that it *is*, and *is not*; for Substance and Matter, you must know, are Terms of equal Latitude and Meaning; wherefore, if the Soul be Immaterial Substance, it is Immaterial Matter, *i. e.* *is*, and *is not*, Matter. But they are deceiv'd who think to pass this upon us for Proof; for I demand again what Assurance they can give us that Matter and Substance are equivalent Terms, so that
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whatever is not Matter ceases to be any Thing ? It will be said, or in Effect what they say amounts to this, that they are not able to conceive of any Thing besides Matter: So saith *Velleius* the *Epicurean* in *Cicero*, *Aperta simplexque Mens, nulla re adjuncta, quæ sentire possit, fugere intelligentiæ nostræ vim & notionem videtur*.^{*} But what dare we conclude from hence ? That 'tis impossible for any Thing else to exist ? Nothing less. A Man born blind can form no Idea of the Objects peculiar to Sight, and yet they who have the Use of their Eyes will not be very forward to grant that his Ignorance proves it a Con-
 diction there should be more Senses than Four ; or in deed that it proves any thing but it self.

You are not able to conceive of any Substance but Matter. And have you a Conception of material Substance ? By all means produce it, if you have. For my Part, I always thought the utmost we could say of Matter went no farther than this, that it is somewhat endow'd with

^{*} *Cicer. de N. D. L. I. ad Init.*

with Extension and Solidity ; but of this somewhat it self, I was so ignorant as to imagine we had no Idea, and must confess, am no wiser still. And if others lie under the same Ignorance, they will acknowledge that we may have as clear a Notion of Immaterial Substance, as of Material. We have the same Certainty that something exists thinking, as we have of any thing extended, and tho' we have no Idea of the thing which thinks, let it not therefore be concluded that this thinking Thing is Matter, unless from our not being able to conceive of that something which is extended, we will infer that it is nothing at all. For, in short, our Ignorance proves there is no Substance at all, or is no Proof but there may be Immaterial Substances, as well as Material.

Yet further, let it be explain'd what they mean by not being able to conceive of Immaterial Substance. Is it not that they cannot form an *Imaginative* Idea of it ? That it escapes their Fancy ? And will not be represented under a sensible Appearance ? This every one knows to

be their Meaning ; and it amounts to this most profound Reasoning, I will not lieve there is such a Thing as immaterial Substance, because I cannot imagine it, or frame such an Idea of it as would evince it to be material ; for could I make to my self an Image of the Soul (which is what these Men endeavour to do, even as it is Immaterial, and which till they can perform they will not be perswaded of its Immateriality) the Soul would *ipso facto* be suppos'd to be material. Just as if a blind Man should argue there could not be a Sense more than he had, because the Objects of any such fifth Sense did not come under the Notice of either of his Four ; not considering, that if they did, Sight would not be a distinct Sense. And is it not a little hard that Men will not be satisfied, unless a Thing be prov'd to exist by a Medium which would directly prove it not to exist ?

But I have not yet done ; the Denial of the Possibility of Immaterial Substances hath its Foundation in a Prejudice, which if we allow of, we must not
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only believe there is no Incorporeal Substance; but even in Contradiction to our own Experience, that there is no thinking Substance. The Reason is, that Cogitation, wheresoever we place it, is not a whit more level to the Apprehension than Immateriality. I am indubitably conscious of my thinking; but if I examine what it is I do when I think, if I endeavour to grasp at my Thought, and would have a distinct Knowledge of it, I am lost, I am confounded; I give over the Enquiry, in Despair of finding out how my Soul thinks, as much as I am of comprehending how it can be Immaterial.

I have been the longer upon this, because 'tis probable, the fancying a Contradiction in the Idea of an incorporeal Being lies at the Bottom of most Mens Prejudices against the Immateriality of human Soul; theirs, I mean, who will not allow it possible for the Soul to be immaterial, as generally, I believe they do not, who hold it to be material. They conclude it impossible the Soul should be immaterial (by consequence? or be-

cause there are some Things observable concerning it which cannot agree to an immaterial Being? No; but) because they think it impossible there should be any immaterial Substance at all; the Notion involving a Contradiction. Accordingly it is remarkable of most of the Materialists, both antient and modern, that they have not been contented with asserting only the Materiality of the Soul, but have, (those of them who pretended to believe the Existence of a Deity,) taught the Deity Himself to be likewise a Corporeal Being: And from the Belief of a Material God to the Belief of none at all, the Transition is easie; as I make no doubt but Atheism hath frequently proceeded by such Steps. The Use I make of this Particular is, that seeing it is not impossible there should exist immaterial Substances, it looks exceeding probable, even at first Glance, that Cogitative, Self-active Beings are such; in regard Cogitation and Self-Motion are the most distant Things that can be from all the known Properties of Matter,

2. Is not the Union of Soul and Body absolutely unconceivable, on Supposition of the Soul's being immaterial? All Union is perform'd by Contact; but what Contact can there be between Body and Spirit, a solid and unsolid Substance? The one is too subtle for the other to fasten on. This is the Objection; the Answer follows.

In the Union of Matter with Matter, two Things must concur, *Juxtaposition*, and *Cohesion*. As to the former, Spirit and Matter have this Advantage for Union above Matter and Matter, that whereas the Parts of Matter can only exist in contiguous Spaces, or Spaces bounding one on the other, Spirit and Matter may exist in the very same Space. For the other, if the Coalition of two such dissimilar Substances as Soul and Body be thought inexplicable, the Cohesion of the Parts of Matter is not less so. The Invention of hooked Particles, or of a certain glutinous Substance, only puts the Difficulty one Remove farther off, for still the Question returns, how
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the Parts of these Hooks, or of this Glue, (for Parts they have) hang together? Which Question 'tis not possible we should solve without having Recourse to some foreign Pressure, either of the surrounding Matter, or some invisible Agent. And by a like Method I will undertake to account for the Union of Soul and Body. As thus; Gravitation being something extrinſick to the Notion of Matter, ſo as to flow from the meer Will of the Creator, not any innate Force of its own, there is no Abſurdity in ſuppoſing there may be ſomething analogous to it between a Spirit and a certain Portion of Matter prepared and fitted up for its Reception. Why hath God impreſs'd an attractive or gravitating Force on Bodies, but in Order to keep the Parts of the Univerſe together? And for the ſame Reason, when he deſigns the Union of a Soul and Body, He may for the effecting it, give them a mutual Attraction. which, however ſhall not take Place till they are come together; and then the Conſequence of it will be their Adherence to one another

ther in the closest Manner imaginable. The Loadstone and the Iron when they touch are not easily separated ; and yet they touch only in their Surfaces ; how powerfully then must this Attraction operate between two Substances co-existing in the same Space ? Doubtless, the Attraction must be very strong ; but being arbitrary, may be suspended, upon what Conditions God sees fit, particularly a Fitness in the Body to discharge the necessary Functions of Life, which Condition failing, the Attraction ceases, and the Union is dissolv'd. This, I confess, is but an Hypothesis, but 'tis an Hypothesis as likely to be true as any yet found out to account for the Cohesion of Matter.

3. There is a mutual Dependence of Soul and Body in their Operations upon each other. The Soul receives Ideas by the Body, and the Body is animated by the Soul, and directed in the Motion of the several Members at its Pleasure. The Soul arrives to the Maturity of its Faculties by the same Degrees the Body comes

comes to its Strength and Stature, and most Times decays gradually with that; the Infirmities of Infancy and Old Age being common to both. If one is affected, the other doth not remain insensible; they rejoice and grieve, are serene, and cloudy together. The Body being in good Temper, the Mind feels it self vigorous and fitted for Contemplation; but as the Spirits of the one flag, the other becomes tired of thinking.

In Reply to this, I might take Notice that in many of its Operations, the Soul acts plainly separate from the Body, and without borrowing any immediate Assistance from it, as in its Abstractions, in the Contemplation of Spiritual Objects, and in general, in all its Reasonings and Deductions: For tho' it cannot be denied that a certain Disposition of the Brain is by a Law of the Creator made necessary to the regular Operations of the Mind, yet hath not the Brain directly any Manner of Share in them. A Man during Sleep is not ordinarily capable of coherent Thinking; a Sound happens

happens to rouse him, and then he thinks justly and pertinently; his waking Thoughts are purely his own, and in no proper Sense caus'd by the Sound that wak'd him, tho' had he not been wak'd, he had had no such Thoughts. And then as for Corporeal Images, in the Conveyance of which the Body may seem of Right to claim a greater Interest, in reality it is only the Condition of them. Stop either of the Senses, and the Objects of that Sense are not to be perceiv'd by the Mind; and so, if you place a Veil between the Eye and any Object, the Object is no longer discernable; remove that Let, and it is presently seen; and yet whether there be or be not a Wall of Partition between the Object and the Eye, the Eye is still the same, and endued with the same Power of seeing. That the Clearness and Vivacity of our sensible Ideas depends on the Perfection of the Organs of Sense is not more wonderful than that Objects appear more distinct or obscure according to the Medium thro' which the Images of them pass.

Possibly, it will be here enquir'd, what Advantage or Hindrance Body can be to Spirit in its Correspondence with the Corporeal World? To which, I answer, that it seems most natural to think that Matter cannot by any proper intrinick Efficacy of its own, either help or prejudice a Spirit's View of outward Objects. It is indeed difficult to divine by what Way Immaterial Beings hold Intelligence with Material, and come acquainted with their Properties and Operations. But this, to say the least, is not harder to conceive than how, supposing the Soul to be material, surrounding Objects should produce in us the Ideas and Sensations they do; for by the Way, what Relation have the Sensation of Heat, and the Motions that occasions it? The Connection between certain Motions and certain Ideas and Sensations must be arbitray, of whatever Substance we imagine the Soul to be; and therefore certainly, it were unjust to accuse us of making absurd Suppositions, if we say the Soul is immaterial, and God of his own good Pleasure hath appointed
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the bodily Senses to be the Occasional Causes of its Ideas.

I might farther observe of this Objection, that if it concludes any thing, it concludes abundantly too much, tho' I verily believe, not more than they who make it would be glad to have it prove. If the Soul must therefore be material because its Operations are affected by the Body, for the same Reason Thinking must be a material Action; for tho' the Soul be Matter, yet if it think by Virtue of a Power planted in it supernaturally by God, and altogether different from its other Powers and Qualities, the Difficulty of conceiving how Thought should be any way influenc'd by the Temper of the Body is much the same as upon the Hypothesis of the Soul's Immateriality. So that, as was said, Thought must be a material Property, if this Argument for the Materiality of the Soul holds good. But that thinking is not a material Quality will be demonstrated in its Place.

The Command the Soul hath over the Body, hath not yet been consider'd, nor will I now pretend to explain it;

not that I apprehend the Difficulty to arise from the Immateriality of the Soul ; I am equally at a Loss, if I go upon the Supposition of its being material, *e. g.* a Labourer wills the Motion of his Hands, and this Order of his Will is obey'd without the least Delay or Reluctance. Whence is this instantaneous Motion ? Is it communicated by Impulse from the Soul ? That is perfectly incomprehensible, because the Motion begins not the Hand, but in the Brain, and from thence is propagated to the extreme Members. Now of the Parts immediately agitated, the Soul having no Idea, nor any Thought of their Motion, what makes them move ? Of the several Fibres which it holds as it were by the Ends, not knowing which are necessary to the Motion design'd, or that any of them are so, how comes it to make Use of the right, without Design, and without ever mistaking ? Explain this to me, and then triumph if I cannot tell the Manner of communicating Motion from an immaterial Substance. But tho' this Difficulty were got over, there

is still something behind which requires a Solution, *viz.* from whence the Motion of the Soul it self takes its Rise. The Soul impels the Body, but what impels the Soul? A Volition, a Thought; and if a meer Thought gives Beginning or Direction to the Motion of a material Soul, where's the Absurdity that the same Thought in an Immaterial Substance moves the Members of the Body? The Truth is, God seems to have invested our Souls with this despotick Empire to facilitate the Belief of his actuating the Universe, and that we might not want a faint Shadow and Resemblance of the Manner of his doing it. I cannot, sure, imagine the Universe is so unwieldy but Omnipotence may turn and manage it, when, weak and dependent as I am, the sole Act of my Will suffices to put that in Motion which before was at Rest.

4. Brutes appear to have Sense and Reason, which in them, however, can proceed from none but but a material Principle. But,

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1. Who inform'd us that Brutes have Sense and Reason? We are conscious of no such Thing in them, as we are in our selves, and therefore cannot fairly demand (which yet some will do with an Air of Insult) that if Brutes, notwithstanding all the Proofs they give of their Sensibility, may be as blockish and stupid as unanimated Matter, what infallible Assurance can we have, that we our selves do think and reason, feel Pleasure, or Pain? Yes, every Man's Consciousness that he thinks, is a Proof of it that can never deceive him. And do not other Creatures give us plain Indications of Reason? I grant it; but not a Reason of their own. To go no farther than those common Instances of the admirable Architecture of a Bird's Nest, and the Uniformity observ'd by Birds of the same Kind in the Model they work after, these are such Discoveries of a Reason somewhere, as at the same Time evidently demonstrate, it belongs not to them; in them it is only a blind Instinct (as might be shewn by
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other Considerations were it needful) tho' in regard of Providence, it is infinite Wisdom guiding them to their respective Ends. And why should not the same Account satisfy concerning all their Actions? I would not willingly be mistaken here, and with the Followers of *Descartes* thought to resolve all the Motions of Bruit Creatures into meer Mechanism. To me it seems no less than impossible that the faint and inconsiderable Impressions of the Master's Voice, for Instance, upon his Dog, can have such a Force as to produce the wonderful Effects we see often to follow. I should therefore rather chuse to trace up all this to a general Will of God, at once comprehending all particular Objects. It is acknowledg'd that God always foresaw all the possible Alterations and Rencounters that might ever happen to the Bodies of Animals, and this by one Glance of his Understanding; and why by one Act of his Will, may we not believe, he hath establish'd a Connection and Harmony between the Impressions made on the Body of an Ani-

Animal, and the Motions most for the Preservation of the Animal Machine? in pursuance of which Decree, an Impression being made, the correspondent Motion ensues, not by Virtue of the Laws of Motion, but the Energy of a Divine and arbitrary Decree. And I am the more inclin'd to solve the *Phænomena* in the Brute Creation this Way, because of our not being able, unless by this Hypothesis, to give any Manner of Account of many Things transacted in humane Nature; the Things I mean, are Ideas and Sensations fetch'd from without, to the Production of which the Operations of external Objects on the Sense are no more than improper and Occasional Causes. The true Spring and Original of them is the Ordination of God; and to say the least, it is not in it self more unlikely that certain Impulses in, and upon, the Body of a Brute, should, by the Order of God give Rise to the Motions consequent upon them, than that the same happening to the Body of a Man should by the Efficacy

cacy of the same, will occasion various Sensations and Ideas in the Mind.

2. If it be granted that Brutes perceive and reason, where's the Harm if we add farther that their Souls are Immaterial? O, by no Means; for then they must be immortal too; and Immortality is what these Men do not care to hear of. But how does that follow? They will, its true, be naturally immortal; notwithstanding which, God can annihilate them; neither will their Annihilation draw after it that of humane Souls, which cannot fully answer the End of their Creation in this World, as those of Brutes for any Thing we can say, may do. But let it be unbecoming the Wisdom of the Creator to annihilate Spirit, when dull, insensible Matter remains still in Being; may not the Souls of Brutes live after the Death of their Body? We know not what Ends divine Providence may have to serve by them in an after State, what Revolutions they may pass thro', and the several Conditions that may be allotted them agreeable

to their Nature. And if there were room for Guesſes, I would make this one, that the Souls of Brutes have Faculties capable of rational and moral Operations, tho' at preſent not able to exert them (which is confeſſedly the Caſe of Ideots) but being ſubjected to the Dominion of Man, and to ſerve his Uſes and Occaſions in the preſent State, are purpoſely laid under a temporary Incapacity thro' a Defect in the Organs of the Bodies to which they are united; and conſequently when they ſhall have accompliſh'd the Ends of the Creator in this inferior Station, they may be remov'd where they ſhall act more ſuitably to the Dignity of their Nature, and more for their own Happineſs. Even this is far leſs improbable than that the vaſt Capacities, the uſeful Faculties and Divine Operations of a reaſonable Soul have their Abode in a System of Matter, and enjoy none but ſuch a poor precarious Exiſtence as that can afford them.

S E C T. II.

These Prejudices remov'd, I shall now in the Second Place, produce the Arguments on which I ground my Assertion of the Soul's Immateriality. And as I said at first, the general Medium I shall make Use of, is Consciousness or Thought. Matter cannot think; and if so, unquestionably the Soul is Immaterial. To make good this Proposition, I shall advance by the following Steps. Thinking is not essential to Matter. Is not a Mode of any other Property belonging to Matter, whether known or unknown. Nor a Property superinduc'd by Almighty Power.

First, Thinking is not an essential Property of Matter. And in Truth, it is well 'tis not; for a good natur'd Man that believ'd all Things above and under, and round about him full of Life and Perception, if he judg'd of them by himself, would be always in Pain, whatever Posture he was in, whether

standing, sitting, or lying, for that great Number of poor distressed Particles, which he would be afraid of incommoding either Way. Unless you had rather suppose him happily made acquainted with Mr. *Hobb's* Distinction, and from him to have learnt to say, that tho' all Matter doth think, yet it is not conscious of it; which, if not in his Meaning, in the Terms, I am sure, implies something very much like a Contradiction.

But to be more serious; (tho' indeed the Matter little deserves it) they who think it plainly demonstrable that Matter is infinitely divisible, and any Portion after it hath been dividing, if you will, Millions of Years, can never be resolv'd into Parts absolutely simple and uncompounded, even tho' Omnipotence it self should attempt the reducing it to such a State, will grant that it unexceptionably follows from the Reason I shall afterwards give, why thinking can never exist in a divisible Being, if this Reason be good, that it cannot, either in the Act or Power, be essential to Matter. But tho' there should be Atoms or indiscerptible

cerpible Points of Matter, yet actual Thinking cannot be essential to Matter for this Reason, that if essential to any, it must be equally necessary to all, and so there will be as many distinct percipient Beings as there are Atoms to make up this vast bulky Universe; a Supposition which all our Thoughts recoil at: For, at this Rate, a Man is not one intelligent Being; but a Multitude, a a Commonwealth, a World, of them. Upon which, I ask, how it happens there is but one and the same Sensation for the whole Body? Touch whatever Part you please, we are invincibly conscious, 'tis one and the same Self feels the Impression. Sometimes, indeed, I perceive one Part of my Body affected, sometimes another; but still it is I that perceive it, that vital conscious Principle which thinks what I now write. Should it be suggested, that the Sameness of the Sensation may be accounted for by supposing that all the thinking Particles in one Person club all their Perceptions into one general Consciousness, I shall have Occasion to lay open the

the Folly of any such Supposition before I come to the End of this Discourse.

And as the Act, so the Power of thinking, cannot be essential to Matter. By Power, I understand an immediate Capacity of thinking, which, Objects presented, and all Impediments remov'd, without any farther Alteration in the Being that possesses it, will exert it self, or at least may be brought into actual Cogitation. Now if such a Power be essential to Matter, every Particle of Matter, must be actually cogitative. For what should hinder it? Not its fellow Particles, for the utmost one Atom can operate on another, is only to knock against it, and thereby put it in Motion or reduce it to Rest. But what hath either Motion or Rest to do with Thinking? Thinking is as widely distant from Local Motion as Colour is from Sound. An Atom is such an obstinate inflexible Thing that after all the hammering in the World it must remain immutably the same; and therefore to such a Particle Motion and Rest must be equivalent for any Change they can make

make in its other Qualities. And, for interesting the Power of God, some Men will be cautious how they allow him any Share in the Management of the World, for fear he should interpose where they would not have him. But after all, I need not be solicitous about proving Thinking not essential to Matter, when none among the Scepticks of the present Age are hardy enough to stand by such an Assertion.

Secondly, Thinking is not a Mode of any Property belonging to Matter, whether known or unknown. This Parcel of Matter cannot enjoy the Privilege of thinking, while its Neighbour remains in its Original State of Insensibility, by having one or more of its old Properties diversified. As, for Instance, by the modifying its Extension into any imaginable Figure or Texture of the Parts, even those that are most minute, or by a Difference in Motion, as to Kind or Degree. My Reason is, that after Figure and Motion have run thro' all the Variety they are capable of; they are
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Figure and Motion still. Consequently, if Thought were no more than a new Appearance of these or any other Properties of Matter, it would be impossible to reflect on a Thought without framing an Idea of the Material Property or Properties of which it was a simple or a mixed Mode ; as we are not able to conceive of this or that Figure, and yet have no Idea of Extension, or of this or that Sort or Degree of Motion, and at the same Time be without any Idea of Motion ; or of a Mixture of the Modes of several Qualities, and have no Knowledge of the Qualities so compounded and mix'd. The Species of Necessity involving the Idea of the Genus. But now let any one tell me, whether he be conscious that his Thoughts are thus allied to any Property of Matter. If he saith, *Not* ; let him not then imagine, that Thought is only an old Attribute of Matter in a somewhat newer fashion'd Dress than it us'd to wear. And, without going out of my Way, what hath been said obviates a common Suggestion, that Thinking, tho' no Mode of Magnitude

tude, or Figure or Motion, or in short, of any of the known Attributes of Matter, may, perchance, be a Mode of some latent and unknown Quality; a Supposition which apparently contradicts itself; for a Mode of a Property being known, how can that Property remain still unknown? If Thought, which we are conscious to be only a particular Way of modifying some Attribute of Body, can that Attribute lie conceal'd? Not till I can be suppos'd to have the Idea of any particular Sort of Motion, and have no Idea of Motion, or of some particular Species of Figure, and not be able to form a Notion of Extension.

If it be said, that Thinking is not Motion or Figure, or any other Property of Matter, separate, or compounded, but a Result from one or more, I answer, that it is impossible any Power or Quality belonging to Matter should produce an Effect entirely *de novo*; and consequently, if Thought be the Result of any material Property or Properties, it can only be a new Turn or Appearance

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given to one or more old Properties, which unavoidably runs us upon the Absurdity before-mentioned. That no Power or Quality of Matter can produce an Effect entirely *de novo*, is as plain as that it cannot produce something out of nothing. The Truth of this is obvious to the first Reflections of the Mind.

This single Argument, if it hath the Evidence I apprehend to be in it, is as decisive as a Thousand. Yet because I had rather be charg'd with doing an unnecessary Thing, than omitting what is needful; and because of two Arguments equally conclusive, one Man is more struck with this, another with that; I add farther,

Every Quality of Matter, not essential to it, is a mere Relation. Matter itself is unchangeably the same. The Particles of it may be remov'd nearer to, or farther off from, one another, they may stand in this, or that Scituation, but in themselves, receive not the least Alteration. What Difference there is, lies in this, that when rang'd after this Manner they make one Figure, when after
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that another ; when a greater Number meet they make one kind of Magnitude, when a less, another, as a Body of a Foot or Inch Diameter. But what are all these Figures ? They only express the different Relations the Particles of a System have one to the other ; or altogether to other Bodies. What these several Magnitudes ? But the Relation of more, or fewer Particles ; the same holds in Motion. Whether the Particle be mov'd or not mov'd, whether it continue to move in the same Line, or move in different, the Particle, if we well consider it, remains without all Change ; only that it is transferr'd from Place to Place, and, by that means hath successively a Relation to different Points of Space. He that reflects on this cannot possibly believe Thought to be a Mode of Matter and Motion, because, all Modes being incontestibly nothing but Relations, or Comparisons made by the Mind, Thought if a Mode of Matter would be no more ; which is too absurd for any one of common Sense to digest.

And now, were I able to advance no farther in the Argument, I could not repent of the little Pains I have been at to prove Thinking not essential to Matter, nor a Mode of any Power belonging to Matter ; for this alone effectually silences the Atheistical Sceptick, who in Complement to Mankind tells them they are no better than so many Machines, and their wisest Thoughts and Consultations but the lucky Hits of Atoms and pure Growth of Matter and Motion. This Whim, I say, hath been sufficiently confuted, from whence 'tis necessarily inferred that there is a supreme Being, who, should we allow the Soul to be material, hath given it a Power of thinking, the conferring of which Power is an Act of Omnipotence, and as hard to conceive as the Creation of Substance. In other Words, that there is a God, and Creation *ex nihilo*, is no Contradiction, no Impossibility.

Thirdly, Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking superadded to it. I do not say, that a Substance having this Power cannot

cannot be settled in Matter; on the contrary, if this be a proper Sense of superadding, I own God hath superadded a Power of thinking to Matter, by substantially uniting the Soul to the Body. But my Meaning (and indeed the only Meaning under Dispute) is that a Power of thinking cannot be made to inhere immediately in Matter, or that Matter cannot be the next and immediate Subject of a Power of Thinking. This Particular well prov'd, shews Mr. *Lock* not to have been infallible, when he said, that * *'tis impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency hath given to some Systems of Matter fitly dispos'd, a Power to perceive and think.* I am mistaken if the Demonstration of this which Mr. *Locke* thought it impossible to demonstrate, doth not follow.

First, Thinking is utterly inconsistent with the Divisibility of Matter; or a Quality that will never be brought to agree

* H. U. L. IV. C. iii. S. 6.

agree to any thing that is not strictly *one*. I shall prepare my Way to this Argument by several Propositions.

1. Thinking is an absolute Quality. Of a Rose, tho' a relative Quality, a meer external Denomination in the Rose, is an absolute real Sensation in him that smells it. Now, I pray, where should Thinking properly exist, if not in the Being that thinks? They who assert Heat to be a relative Quality in Fire, do, in Effect, say, it is not there at all, that 'tis only a Name misapplied by vulgar Conceit. Whoever therefore supposes a Substance to think (whether that Substance be Matter or Spirit) must suppose thinking to be an absolute, inherent Quality, or he supposes an absolute Contradiction, that is, he supposes a Substance at the same Time doth, and doth not think.

2. Thinking is a primary Quality. No Property can be assign'd of a larger Extent comprehending this under it. And what better Proof have we than this, that Motion and Solidity are primary Qua-

Qualities ? We pass them for such because they are Ideas so generical that we cannot go beyond them ; which we should be able to do if they were only Modes of some more generical Power ; for the same Reason, that from any determinate Species of Figure or Motion, we can proceed to the neighbouring *Genus*, and so on till we come to the *Genus generalissimum*, where the Sight is terminated. Besides, it hath been before prov'd, that all Modes include over and above what is peculiar and distinguishing, the general Idea of the Attributes they are Modes of ; and that therefore, if Thinking were a Mode of some more generical Attribute, we could not possibly be ignorant what was this Attribute, because the Idea of it would be involv'd in Thinking. But we know of no such Attribute, and therefore Thinking is not a Mode of it, and if not a Mode of an Attribute, must it self be a primary Quality. N. B. The Term primary applied to Qualities, hath a double Signification ; for either it may be taken absolutely so as to signify
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that there is no Idea, excepting that of the Substance, beyond the Idea of the Quality we call Primary, in which it is founded, and in this Sense Thinking and Motion are not primary Qualities, Thinking presupposing a Power of thinking, and Motion a Power of being mov'd. Or it may signify that there is no Idea or Quality more generical, of which the Quality we name primary, is a Mode or Species; and in this Sense it is, we here term Thinking and Motion primary, *i. e.* generical Qualities.

3. Thinking is a numerical Quality, perfectly simple and uncompounded; not only in the Sense that a Quality is called simple when it is not a Collection of different Qualities, which I have before shewn to be the Case with Thinking; but in the exactest Sense of that Word, when a Quality doth not consist of Parts, each of which is of the same kind as the whole; as the Solidity and Motion of an Atom (a Point of Matter imagin'd so small as to become utterly incapable of further Division) are individual

vidual Qualities ; its Solidity is so one as not to be a Number of Solidities, and its Motion so one as not to be a System of Motions. Now in the same Sense that these are indivisible Qualities, I affirm Thinking or Consciousness to be so, *i. e.* No one Consciousness can be compounded of two or more several Consciousnesses. For in case several Consciousnesses may unite into one, either their Union destroys their Distinction, or it doth not. If it doth, I desire to know how this general Consciousness subsists? After no other Manner than a Whole constituted of several Parts, can exist without these Parts, or a universal exist without Particulars. If on the other hand these partial Consciousnesses after they are united together, remain distinct, how can they be one? In no other Sense than a Multitude of Sands make one Heap ; for so a Parcel of Consciousnesses thrown together would be a Heap of Consciousnesses, not one Consciousness. They could not approach ever the nearer, being truly one on account of their Neighbourhood. Yes, some may say,

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they altogether form one whole Consciofness, whereas separately taken they are but Pieces of Consciofness. To expose the Vanity of this Conceit, I shall enter a little farther into the Matter. When, therefore it is said that Consciofness is made up of partial Consciofnesses, the Meaning must be that Consciofness inheres in a Being that hath Parts, and that each Part hath its Share of the Consciofness. Now let us suppose these Parts remov'd at a considerable Distance from one another; Consciofness being an inherent Quality, their Separation would not annihilate their Thinking, but each must still have its piece of a Thought. But then these Pieces of Consciofness, thus disjoin'd, can no more make one Consciofness than the Consciofnesses lodg'd in the Heads of several Men can make one. Well then, let us farther try, what can be done by bringing these Consciofnesses together again. What will they gain by this Contiguity? Still each Part can be consciof only for it self; it cannot share in the consciofness of the rest, any more than

than the Solidity of one Particle of Matter can be the Solidity of another; which is as self-evident, as that a Thing must be itself, and no other. And now where shall we seek for a common Consciousness, that may run through all, and, like a Band, tie them together? I cannot possibly guess where; and yet such a common Consciousness is necessary to constitute all these Parts one thinking conscious Being. But, when all is done, that Consciousness is an individual Quality, cannot be made plainer than every Man's own Consciousness proves it to him, if He will be at the trouble of the least Reflection in the World.

4. A System of Matter consists of just so many distinct, compleat, Beings as it hath Parts. Be these Parts united after never so compact a Manner, their Distinctness is not hereby in the least endangered, each of them remaining, as it was before, a compleat Being in it self, capable of being divided from the rest, and existing separate and independent from them. I deny not but a System of
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Matter, may, if God so please, be render'd indivisible by any created Power ; but this alters not the case, because in it self, and to Almighty Power, it is as divisible as ever, and, if divisible, must have Parts antecedent to their actual Division.

5. Every primary or generical Power, inhering in the whole of any System, is made up of Qualities of the same Kind, inhering in the several constituent Parts. Thus, the Motion of the whole consists of the Motions of the Parts, and the Solidity of the whole is the total of the Solidities of the parts. This is too plain to need or be capable of Proof. Tho' if it be desir'd, I will give the Reason why it is so. All specifical Powers having their Original from a Combination of Particles (excepting the Species of Motion) are really but so many Names to signify these Combinations ; and a Combination, always supposing more than One, cannot be attributed to any single Particle. But every Particle is solid, is moveable, and of a certain Magnitude, from whence
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result the Solidity, Motion, and Magnitude of a System, which would be eternally destitute of all those Properties, if they were not first found in the separate Particles.

6. If actual Thinking can never be seated in a System of Matter, neither can a Power. He that proves the one, proves the other ; unless you can reconcile your being absolutely and for ever unable to do a Thing, and your having a Power to do it.

And now laying all these Propositions together, the The Argument sum'd up. Conclusion is that a System of Matter cannot possibly have a Power of Thinking superadded to it. For it cannot think, but Thinking must inhere in it, because Thinking is an absolute Quality ; and the Consciousness that inheres in the Whole, must, as it is a primary Quality, consist of the Consciousnesses of the Parts ; but Consciousness being a simple individual thing, cannot be made up of partial Consciousnesses, and for that Reason can never have its abode in a System

System of Matter, where it cannot be suppos'd to exist, unless compounded.

If this Argument be not conclusive, I despair of knowing when an Argument is so. Nothing can have a more promising Appearance. Neither is it all weaken'd by Matter of Fact, in Nature or Art, both which, 'tis pretended, furnish us with innumerable Instances of Powers and Qualities in the whole, resulting from the Contributions of the Parts, and yet not to be found in the Parts disjunctly taken. Thus the Roundness of a Globe arises from the Parts terminating after such a Manner, that the whole Compass of the Surface is equally distant from the Center. Nevertheless the Parts singly consider'd are none of them round, tho' altogether they form that Figure. Thus the Power of a Rose to produce so agreeable a Smell, is owing to the peculiar Texture and Disposition of its insensible Parts, which detach'd from one another, or dispos'd of in a different Way, are void of that Power. Thus, the Power of a Clock to determine the time of the Day, proceeds from the Scituation, the

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Comparative Bigness, and Motion of the Wheels and Springs that compose it; which notwithstanding, the Subject of this Power is only the whole Clock, not any one Piece of it. And why, in like manner, may not a conscious Being be made up of Parts, which singly taken are not conscious, tho' when combin'd they are so?

A very moderate Degree of Attention will discover the Impertinence of this Objection; for (omitting other Answers that might be given to it) none of the Powers or Qualities here enumerated are of a primary Nature. Roundness is not a Composition of Parts that are round, because only a Mode of Figure. And the same holds of the other Qualities alledg'd, which, as far as they are really inherent Qualities, (and we are concern'd with them no farther) are mixed Modes. As to mention only the Virtue of a Clock in measuring the Hours; this, as far as it signifies a Power absolutely residing in the Clock, is no more than a skilful Mixture of certain Modes of Figure, Magnitude and Motion. And what then are
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the Rules we follow, when from these we argue to thinking, which, it hath been evinc'd, is a primary Quality? Let it be once made appear that the Solidity of a material System is not the Sum of the Solidities of the Parts, and I will readily acknowledge my self mistaken in asserting the Consciousness of the same System to be a Mass of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.

But is not Extension in the same Rank of Properties as Solidity? Now an extended System is made up of Parts unextended.

To this trifling Objection, if I must return an Answer, I say, that in Case Matter admits not of infinite Divisions (as this Objection supposes it doth not) Extension is no primary Quality, but Magnitude, or spatiality, having under it these two general Modes; an Atom, which is Matter possessing a single Point of Space; or *Quid extensum*, when several Particles of Matter, settling in Points of Space next adjoining to one another, give occasion for considering them as one Body or System.

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From what hath been said, it follows that tho' perfect Strangers to the inmost Essences of Soul and Body, we are yet able to demonstrate that the Soul is not, at least, a System of, Matter, from the utter Irreconcilableness of the Properties of the one and the other, *i.e.* of Thinking and Divisibility. And our Mathematicians tell us, that 'tis of the Nature of Matter to exist in Parcels or Systems, and impossible it should do otherwise, being infinitely divisible. But however that be, a learned Person hath well observ'd, in a Letter I receiv'd from him, that 'tis the Opinion of all our modern Scepticks, that the Soul is a System of Matter ; so that, if his Observation be true, (as in all Probability it is) the Argument here manag'd, at once disarms all these Men. And then, as the same Gentleman farther remarks, on Supposition there be indivisible Particles of Matter, and that such an indivisible Particle may be a thinking Substance ; yet the natural Immortality of the Soul would be safe enough. And this is the Reason why our Scepticks

never go upon that Supposition, because they are not concerned to disprove the Immateriality of the Soul, any farther than they can thereby disprove its natural Immortality.

There is only one Thing commonly urg'd against this Argument, yet behind; which, because if I conceal'd it, some would be ready to judge it was for its Strength, I shall briefly consider. This Argument, say they, may as well be turn'd to prove immaterial Substance incapable of thinking, if Extension be not shut out of its Idea. To which I reply.

1. Extension is no Part of our Idea of immaterial Substance. All we know of it is, that it thinks, is not solid, and, by Consequence from its Thinking, is indivisible too. But neither of these Properties, as far as we are acquainted with them, having any Relation to Space, or Dependence on it, from them we can get no Assistance in our Enquiry, after what Manner a Spirit or immaterial Substance exists in Space. 'Tis enough we know

know it not to be divisible, like a material System: Whether, as it is indivisible, it be likewise unextended; or whether, if endow'd with a kind of Expansion, this or any other Word in our Language doth properly express it, we have no Room to argue for Want of Ideas; nor can this Want of Ideas be fairly improved to the Disadvantage of immaterial Substance, because against a Capacity of Thinking in a System of Matter, we argue not from any Thing unknown, but from an Imperfection we certainly know to be in it, namely, its Divisibility.

2. This Objection is founded in something, which I think it impossible to prove, viz. That every simple Being, every Being strictly one, is *minimum Natura*. We find this to be true in Fact of a solid Being, and in its Solidity meet with the Cause of it. For a solid System being solid throughout, by Reason of which Solidity every Particle hath a distinct Superficies of its own; though never so many Particles unite together,

from whence flows the Extension of Matter, each of them will after all continue a compleat Being in it self, actually distinct, and therefore separable from all the rest. But now from solid to unsolid Being, from material Expansion to immaterial, *non valet Consequentia*. According to our Idea of Immensity, there is some Sort of Expansion in the divine Essence, and he that should assert of this adorable Essence, that it is (I will not say actually divisible, for its Infinity alone may secure it from that, but) made up of proper Parts, would be thought greatly to detract from the Perfection of the ever-blessed and most glorious God.

3. If you still persist that all Expansion implies Divisibility; for once, we will suppose that it doth. Upon this Supposition I affirm that the Soul is unextended, and challenge any one to shew me the Absurdity of it. The Soul may hereby seem to be shrunk into an absolute Parvitude, a poor solitary Punct; but there is really no such Matter: For on Condition Expansion and Parts always

ways go together, the supreme Essence cannot be allowed to be expanded ; but, though not expanded in a proper Sense, you will not therefore imagine that it must dwindle into a Point. Whatever be the Relation that Thought hath to Space, 'tis plain, it can't exist in it, after the Manner of an extended Thing, unless we can first bring ourselves to conceive that Thought hath Quantity, and may be larger or shorter, broader or narrower, &c. nor yet as a Point, unless it be first allow'd, that a single Point may be capable of ten Thousand different Modifications, and why should it be deem'd impossible for the thinking Substance to enjoy the same Manner of Existence as Thought, which is its Action. This from the Essence of God, I am sensible, is a Way of Arguing some Men will little regard ; nor was it designed for them : But such who, with me, believe God to be an immaterial Substance, though not of my Mind, who think it demonstrable, that the Soul likewise is of a Nature entirely distinct from Matter. I have now done with the first Argument,

ment, which proves that a System of Matter can never think. Those which follow are level'd against all Matter without considering it in a System.

Secondly, The power of Thinking is not essential to Matter : But we have the same Reason to believe it essential to that in us which thinks, as to conclude Solidity essential to Body ; and therefore the Soul, or that in us which thinks, is not Matter. Solidity is not Matter. Solidity is reckoned essential to Body, because it is a primary Quality, or because we consider it as immediately united to the Idea of material Substance without the Intervention of any third Idea, whereas our Ideas of separable Qualities, such as Fluidity, Squareness, Globosity, &c. lead us to the Idea of Extension, in which they have their Foundation. Now forasmuch as we have not the Idea of any Property more radical than this of a Power of Thinking, either let us confess our selves uncertain whether Solidity is so inseparable from material Substance, that it cannot be taken away without the Destruction

struction of the Substance, or be so ingenuous to own, that the thinking Faculty is essential to the Soul; from whence it will of Necessity follow, that the Soul is immaterial. Upon the whole then, having the same Evidence for both, we ought not to doubt of the Immateriality of thinking Substance, till we are dispos'd to doubt whether Matter be essentially solid.

Thirdly, There is the greatest Reason to believe it impossible and a Contradiction for the Power of Thinking to be superadded to Matter, tho' a perfect Monad, because it hath all the Appearance of a gross Absurdity, the Substance preexisting, for any Power whatever to be afterwards brought into it, entirely distinct from all the Powers it had before. A Substance can have no generical Power, but what was produc'd at the Moment it self had a Beginning. Are any Properties essential? Or, which comes to the same, can a Substance be created, and certain Properties not exist as necessary Appendages to it? On Presumption of every Body's agreeing with
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me that it cannot, I demand farther, Whether the Dependence be mutual, so that as the Substance cannot be created without its essential Attributes, these Attributes cannot be produc'd, but the same Act of Power must at once give Being to the Attributes and the Substance they are essential to? I shall explain my self by an Instance; Tho' the Substance of Matter is incapable of receiving Existence from a Fiat of God, that will not at the same Instant bestow it on Solidity and Magnitude, can Solidity and Magnitude be created without the cotemporary Production of any Substance? It lies on those who say, They may, to shew why the Dependence of the Attributes upon the Substance for their Creation should not be the same, as of the Substance on the Attributes. If the Answer be, No, then we are oblig'd either to grant that as Solidity can never be produc'd, unless when a Substance is created to which it is essential, the same is true of all other generical Powers and Qualities, or to demonstrate such a Difference

ference in their Natures, as is the Foundation of this Difference in the Manner of their Existence, that when one Attribute cannot, another may, be introduc'd into Being at a distinct Time from the Substance it is plac'd in, and by a distinct Act of Omnipotence. This I doubt we shall never be able to do. In the mean while I dare appeal to the World, Whether it doth not shock common Sense, that a primary Attribute, not originally in a Substance, should be afterwards made to agree to it? Is not the creating a new Power, the Substance being first made, every whit as unintelligible as the Doctrine of substantial Accidents? In plain Truth, for the Philosophicalness of them, they seem to me exactly match'd; and I see not, but if a Power may be created separately from the Substance, *i. e.* without at the same Time creating the Substance, it may as well be made to exist without inhering in any Substance at all; there being little or no Difference, that I can discern, between creating a Power separate as to Time from any Substance, and the ma-

king it to exist separate as to Space, or any Inhesion it hath in it. When independent on the Substance in its Production, what makes it dependent in its after-Existence? The Substance, which is not the Foundation of its Being, appears not necessary to its Support. Of one Substance added to another I can conceive, and that the same Power is capable of different Modifications; but to talk of creating a new Power, and superadding it to a Substance hath very much the Sound of Nonsense.

Secondary and modal Qualities may be superinduced, forasmuch as the Addition of these is only working upon the old Materials, or another Way of disposing and managing the Qualities before existing, not the Beginning of any Quality entirely new. Among all the infinite Changes and Vicissitudes, which the Parts of this visible World pass under, all the new Forms and Appearances that Matter ever put on, the Number of primary Qualities is, and hath been still the same. One or two Properties of this Nature furnish out this great Variety

Variety of Scenes, and are capable of shifting into ten thousand Times more. And why then should we reckon it possible for a primary Quality to be superadded, when an Instance of this was never known among the numberless Alterations that have happened to Matter ?

Let us try whether Motion, Gravitation, Vegetation, &c. are Instances of this Kind. Motion is not essential to Matter. But a Capacity of being mov'd is, and if Matter move, or rather be mov'd, by external Pulsion, it is not by a new Power put into it.

By Gravitation is meant that Force by which a Body is carried towards its Center, without the Impulse of other Bodies. Now that there is no such Principle truly implanted in Bodies, I think admits of Demonstration, *e. g.* a Stone falling to the Earth is imagined to move by Virtue of this Principle. But the Question is, whether this Principle be lodg'd in the Stone it self. If it be answer'd in the Negative, then Gravitation is no proper inherent Quality

lity in the Stone, and consequently not at all correspondent to Thought, which is a Quality absolutely residing in the Substance that thinks. If it be said, Yes, then upon Supposition the Space for some Distance round the Stone were made perfectly empty, and did so remain, yet this Stone would have a Tendency to move. Inform me which way? Towards the Earth? But why thither? The Communication being cut off by the interjacent Void, the Earth hath no more Relation to the Stone than the Moon, or any other Planet. Must it tend towards the Earth, because that is downwards? Not so neither; for in such a Vacuum, as this Stone is suppos'd to be in, there is neither up nor down, any more than in the extramundane Space. It must therefore endeavour to move every Way, if at all, having no Principle of Choice to direct it this Way rather than that; and an equal Endeavour to move all Ways at the same Time, keeping it, as it must needs do, in a perfect Rest, is equivalent to no Tendency at all. The Experi-

periments of Things descending in *Va-
cuo* create me no Difficulty. On the
contrary, I am extremely pleas'd with
them, as they prove, not that Bodies
have a Principle of Motion within them-
selves, (I have shown before that this
cannot be) but that Matter is conti-
nually impress'd by some invisible Agent.
And so, this admirable Phænomenon is
a plain Argument not only of the Being,
but perpetual Energy and Providence of
the first Cause.

In a Vegetable two Things offer to
be consider'd ; Organization, and Nu-
trition. Its Organization is an Instance
of infinite Skill in the Framer, but with
Regard to the Vegetable is nothing else
but an apt Arrangement of the Parts,
by which it comes to have a Beauty and
a Proportion it wanted before, and is fit-
ted to serve the Uses it was originally
design'd for. Whether God display his
Wisdom upon Matter in the Productions
of Nature, or Man in the Productions of
Art, in neither Case is there any new
Quality added to Matter. Man only
modifies it, and God doth no more ; all
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the Difference being in the Perfection of the Work ; as the same Words are capable of being cast into an elegant and rational Discourse, or the contrary according to the Abilities and Genius of the Writer. Nutrition proceeds not from any Faculty infus'd into Plants, being, in respect of them, only a proper Structure of the Vessels to receive and distribute the alimantal Juices ; and, as to the other concurring Causes, only Matter and Motion under the Direction of a wise Providence ; still no new Quality is superadded entirely different from the Qualities essentially belonging to Matter.

To conclude, the Superintendency of an Almighty Being first laid as a *Postulat-um*, there is nothing unaccountable in the Revolutions of the Planets round their Centers, in the Propagation of the Species, &c. Nothing but what may be expected from Matter in the Hands of infinite Power and Wisdom, without the Addition of any new Powers. And now judge you, if the following
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Passages in * Mr. *Locke* reach the Contr-
 versy between him and the Bishop. The
 Idea of Matter is an extended solid
 Substance; wherever there is such a
 Substance there is Matter; and the Ef-
 fence of Matter, whatever other Quali-
 ties not contain'd in that Essence it shall
 please God to superadd to it. For Ex-
 ample, God creates an extended solid
 Substance without the superadding any
 Thing else to it, and so we may consi-
 der it at rest: To some Parts of it he
 superadds Motion, but it hath still the
 Essence of Matter: Other Parts of it
 he frames into Plants with all the Ex-
 cellences of Vegetation, Life and Beau-
 ty, which are to be found in a Rose or a
 Peach-Tree, &c. To other Parts he
 adds Sense and spontaneous Motion,
 and those other Properties that are to
 be found in an Elephant. Hitherto 'tis
 not doubted but the Power of God may
 go; but if one ventures to go one Step
 farther, and say, God may give to Mat-
 ter, Thought, Reason and Volition, as
 well as Sense and spontaneous Motion,
 there

* *Ict. 3. p. 797.*

there are Men ready presently to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator, and tell us he cannot do it. Again, * The Planets have Revolutions about certain remote Centers, which I wou'd have any one explain, or make conceivable by the bare Essence, or natural Powers depending on the Essence of Matter in general, without something added to that Essence which we cannot conceive elsewhere. If to the † Individuals of each Species God had not superadded a Power of Propagation, the Species had perish'd with those Individuals.

Is this Reasoning worthy of so great a Philosopher? excepting the Instances of Sense and spontaneous Motion in Animals (before consider'd) in which Mr. *Locke* begs the Question, all the other Properties which Mr. *Locke* saith are superadded to Matter, really conclude no more than that Matter may be figur'd and mov'd by Almighty Power in Ten thousand Ways, than which nothing more true; and therefore because

* P. 398. † P. 400.

cause the Qualities of Matter may be acted upon and new modified, Matter may receive a new Quality of a Kind perfectly differing from all the Qualities it was possess'd of before; than which, in my Opinion nothing can be more false.

Fourthly, I shall finish with a Consideration which makes it altogether unreasonable to suppose the Soul is Matter, even tho' by the omnipotent Will of the Creator a System of Matter were capable of becoming a cogitative Being. Thinking belongs not essentially to Matter, neither is it a Mode of some other Power originally in Matter, but must, in order to have a Place in it, be superinduc'd by creative Power, and exerted by Matter not consider'd as Matter, but by a Faculty quite foreign to its original Nature and Capacity. But now, for ought appears, a Power of Thinking may be natural to immaterial Substance; nay there are very strong Probabilities that it is so. For,

1. The Faculty of Thinking is the Top of primary Qualities, the original

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Source of all those Excellencies which set some Parts of the Creation so vastly above the rest. And (to borrow the Words of Dr. *Sherlock*) “ Can we think “ the greatest Perfection, in a created “ Nature hath no Subject to which it “ essentially belongs? Which makes the “ greatest Perfection in Nature the most “ perishing and mutable Thing; for if “ there be no Subject or Nature to which “ it essentially belong, it is a mere pe- “ rishing Accident, which might never “ have been, and in Time may never be “ again. ” The Existence of a Body once suppos’d, Extension and Solidity exist by necessary Consequence. Now, as I take it, Necessity of Existence, ev’n that which is only consequential, is the Glory of an Attribute, because it is a nearer Approach to that Being who exists, not indeed by a consequential, but by an absolute Necessity of Nature. And if this consequential Necessity belong to Qualities of so little Significancy, as Extension and Solidity comparatively are, the like Glory cannot be denied to the Power of Thinking, which so incomparably

rably excels them. And it being granted that there is some Substance to which this Quality is essential, it can be only that which is immaterial ; for, as to material Substance, the Reasons have been given before why Thinking cannot be an essential Attribute of that. It is no Prejudice to what I am now contending for, that Symmetry of Parts, Organization, and vegetative Life, are by much preferable to mere Extension and Solidity, and yet not therefore essential to Bodies ; for these are not primary Qualities, and so not really distinct from the essential Attributes of Matter in which they always virtually exist, causing no other Alteration in those Parcels of Matter, where they exist formally and expressly, but only this, that the essential Attributes are represented in a different Light than before. This Objection then doth not touch the Argument, as it is brought to prove a Power of Thinking essential to immaterial Beings, however it may shew the Inconclusiveness as to actual Thinking ; which, I believe, Dr. *Sherlock* aim'd to prove by it.

2. This Argument is somewhat strengthened by that which follows. God is a Spirit, and Thinking doth essentially and necessarily belong to his Being. If it be proper to ascribe a Faculty of Thinking to the divine Essence, which is, and cannot but be always actually cogitative: If, I say, this be allowable, (and I have no Reason to believe but it is, for Argument's sake) the Power of Thinking belongs necessarily to God as a Spirit; the Act and the Perfection of Thinking, as He is a Spirit infinite, eternal and independent. That the Power of Thinking is a necessary Attribute of God as a Spirit, is evident from this Consideration, that otherwise God would want that Simplicity which we cannot but acknowledge is to be found in the most perfect Being. The divine Essence is Immaterial or Spiritual; If therefore this Faculty of Cogitation does not necessarily belong to God as Immaterial, it doth not necessarily belong to the divine Essence, which will infer too great a Distinction between the Essence and the Attributes of God, a Distinction much greater than that between

between the Substance of Matter, and its essential Properties. All that is farther requir'd to make this Argument good is, that immaterial Substance, when applied to God, and to finite created Beings, hath the same Signification. It is possible, for any Thing I can prove to the contrary, that immaterial Substances may differ among themselves, as much as they all differ from those that are material ; and the Spirituality of God may be of a Nature transcendently superior to the Spirituality of all other Beings. This, I say, is possible, and on Supposition the Thing be really so, my Argument comes to nothing. But then on the other Hand, I have never as yet read or heard any good Reason, why we may not understand the Term Spirituality as univocal, to whatever immaterial Being we attribute it ; and till such Reason be produc'd, I must beg Leave so to understand it. It derogates not from the Honour of God's Attributes, that his Creatures, are wise, and just, and holy too : The Characteristicks of finite and infinite sufficiently distinguish them. And why

why should it be thought incredible for God to communicate a Copy of his Essence, as he hath done of his Attributes? Doth one tend more than the other to confound God with his Creatures? Not at all: Finite, and Infinite are as good Marks of Distinction in one Case as in the other. The Essence of God is immense and boundless, that of his Creatures finite and limited.

These Reasons, not to mention others, make it highly probable that immaterial Substances are necessarily possess'd of the Power of Thinking. And is it to be conceived, that God would so confound the Natures and Properties of Things, as to confer a Power essential to one kind of Substance upon another, to which it doth not at all agree, and wherein it must be sort'd with other Powers of so different a Nature, as scarce to have any Thing in common with it but bare Existence? Who can believe this to be likely?

On the Credit of the foregoing Arguments in Vindication of the Soul's Immateriality, I shall take the Liberty to conclude with an Act of Devotion.

O Most glorious God! Thou art the Supreme, uncreated, and eternal Spirit, and thou hast made Man in thine own Image. I behold thee after a Sort in all thy Works. Thy Greatness is declar'd by the Immensity of the Heavens, and their bright innumerable Hosts speak thy Power and thy Wisdom; Thy Goodness is diffus'd with the Light, breaths in the Air, flows in the Sea, and is perpetually fruitful in the Earth: But all these, the Heavens, the Earth, and the Sea, are excellent, great, and wonderful, without knowing it, they glorify thee, and design it not. But there is a Spirit in Man, and the Inspiration of the Almighty giveth him Understanding. To contemplate thy Perfections, and, though after a faint and most imperfect Manner, to reflect their Likeness, is the peculiar Glory of Mankind, to whom thou hast communicated a spiritual and intelligent Nature, allied to Worlds of nobler Beings, and in its very Frame enjoying the Pledges of Immortality. O let not this Spirit, which Thou hast made disgrace its Original, and misemploy its Powers; let it not forget its Dignity, and contradict its Expectations. Thou hast made it
like

like thy self: Let a more entire Conformity to Thee be its most ardent Wish, its continual Endeavour. Thou hast made it utterly unlike all Things here below; by mixing with these inferior Things let it not grow into an Admiration of and Fondness for them, and Alienation from the divine Life. O my God, purify, exalt, and actuate thy own Work. Diffuse thy holy Light over the Region of my Understanding, inspire my Heart with the sacred Warmth of thy Love, and let me feel my self by a sweet and irresistible Attraction drawn away to thee. My Soul is spiritual in its Essence, let it be spiritual in its Desires; let it keep under the Body, trample on the World, be superior to Time and Sense, and with a restless Activity stretch it self towards Immortality, that when set at Liberty from this Load of Flesh, as shortly it will be, it may have the full Possession and Enjoyment of it self, and together with Myriads of happy Beings find it self inseparably united to Thee, the Father of Spirits, and immoveable Center of their Repose.

F I N I S.

